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Conversations with Robert: “Jews as Jews” and the Critique  
of the Critique1
David Seymour
I first met Robert some twenty-five years ago. 
I had just begun my PhD. As time passed, it 
was evident that things were not working 
out between me and my then supervisor, and 
Robert, whom I had met earlier, stepped in 
and offered to take over. After a little hesitation 
(and for the very reasons Robert had identi-
fied), I agreed. I think it would not be an over-
statement to say that without that intervention, 
I would have simply given up.
Robert had an uncanny way of building up 
what was, by then, my shattered confidence. It 
was only after I had finished that I realized how 
Robert put me back together both emotionally 
and academically. Robert would respond to my 
work, first, by saying how good it was, how 
insightful, and then spend the rest of the time 
gently taking it (but not me) to pieces while 
at the same time moving me in directions and 
making connections I did not see myself.
Robert seemed to know me well—all our 
supervisions took place over meals! We would 
chat about everything: from football to art, 
from sociology to philosophy (spiced with 
some gossip) and then we would turn to my 
thesis. I would come home from Leamington 
with reams of paper serviettes covered in notes, 
arrows, and underlinings which I would later lay 
out on my desk and try to piece together! Most 
importantly, they felt less like supervisions and 
more like conversations. It is an approach that 
I now try to adopt with my own post-grads.
Needless to say, we maintained this relation-
ship—which was now a full-blown friendship—
for the following years. I got to know—and 
like—Robert’s family, his brother Tony, who 
sadly passed a few months before Robert, his 
“uncle Harry” whose Yiddish-inspired humor 
would have me in tears, Glynn, and Shoshana. 
And, always our conversations continued. We 
would share ideas and criticisms of our work 
and others as well. Yet, other than on a few rare 
occasions, Robert was never as dismissive as I 
was at that time. He would see something of 
relevance and of interest in most works.
It was as a result of this generosity and open-
ness, that I learnt something important. That 
the shortcomings of any work was not so much 
the initial idea or part of an idea but that the 
initial insight became the whole thing, that, to 
use the language of his last work, it was pushed 
from an interesting particular into an oppres-
sive universal; or, what we would now say, “was 
made to do too much work.”2
In what follows, I would like to draw on 
that insight as well as one the very first things 
Robert told me: “If you want to know anything 
about Jews, don’t look to the antisemites!” He 
also had a habit, which I am not sure I fully 
understand today, of highlighting the conjunc-
tion “as if.” Again, that is something I want to 
work through today, albeit briefly.
As I write these words, I am in constant con-
versation with Robert as I have been in the past. 
By now, I would have spoken to him several times 
from when I had the first germ of the idea through 
to its finished (or, what I thought was finished) 
article. My conversation today has been a culmi-
nation of all our past conversations and all those 
parts of my work that he knew so intimately. 
The subject of my PhD was “Critical 
Theories of Antisemitism.”3 It focused on the 
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ways in which critical theory (understood in a 
broad sense) had tried to make sense of antisemi-
tism and the Holocaust. It ranged from Marx to, 
at that time, Lyotard and Agamben, but, since 
that time, has also included the work of Alain 
Badiou. In the time that is left, I would like to 
revisit that work—and the critiques it made—
through reference to a slogan (for that is what 
it is) that has become popular over the last few 
days and weeks—that, “antisemitism is hostility 
to Jews as Jews.”4 As, I hope will become clear, 
Robert’s insights about antisemites and their 
inability to speak the truth about Jews (assum-
ing there is “a Truth”), about how a particular 
becomes the entirety, and how the “as if ” plays 
out in this subject are the prism through which 
I will be revisiting mine—and Robert’s work.
ANTISEMITISM AS HOSTILITY TOWARD “JEWS 
AS JEWS”
The slogan “Antisemitism is hostility toward 
Jews as Jews” is a simplification of Brian Klug’s 
somewhat positivist attempt at a definition of 
“antisemitism.”5 
This slogan, for Klug, is used, as he says, as a 
“starting point,” but, despite what Klug sees as 
its utility, is quickly dismissed. To cut a longer 
argument short, Klug argues, rightly, that there 
is a dissonance between “Jews” as it appears as 
the subject of the sentence and “Jews” as the 
object or predicate. As it stands, however, the 
slogan marks no difference, there is no distinc-
tion between, what Klug calls “real” Jews (what 
Robert called, “flesh and blood Jews”) and the 
concept of “the Jews” as it appears in the antise-
mitic imagination. Klug is correct when he 
notes that,
Spelling it out, it comes to this: antisemitism is 
a form of hostility to Jews as Jews, where Jews 
are perceived as something other than what 
they are. Or more succinctly: hostility to Jews as 
not Jews. (We appear to have turned our work-
ing definition [“starting point”] on its head). 
For, even if some real Jews fit the stereotype, the 
“Jew” towards whom the antisemite feels hostile 
is not the real Jew at all: the figure of the “Jew” 
is a frozen image protected into the screen of 
a living person. The fact that the image might 
on occasion fit the reality does not change its 
status: it remains an image. . . . And there’s the 
rub: thinking that Jews are really “Jews” is pre-
cisely the core of antisemitism. (p. 5)
To put the matter in other terms, at the 
heart of the slogan, “Antisemitism is hostility 
toward Jews as Jews” is the idea that the latter 
(unmarked on, undifferentiated) antisemitic 
concept of “the Jews” speaks to a truth about 
“real” or “flesh and blood Jews.” 
Two points emerge from this alleged sym-
metry between “flesh and blood” and the 
antisemitic image of “the Jews.” First, and most 
obvious, is the legitimation of the claim made 
by antisemites that antisemitism is but a “logi-
cal” or “rational” response to real Jews’ malevo-
lence; that they are merely “responding” to the 
wrongdoings of Jews. 
Secondly, and pointing in the completely 
opposite direction, is that, as the definition 
stands, there never is, now or in the past, 
antisemitism. As Klug illustrates, and as all of 
us here know, antisemites have never attacked 
Jews as Jews. Rather, they have attacked Jews 
as Christ-killers, usurers, communists, capital-
ists, anti-national, cosmopolitans, nationalist 
(Zionists), the anti-race, and so on and so forth. 
Remember here Klug’s comment that, “[t]he 
fact that the image might on occasion fit the 
reality does not change its status: it remains an 
image” (p. 5).
Yet, the problem Klug identifies here, the 
lack of critical distance between “real” Jews and 
the antisemitic concept of “the Jews” (and the 
definitive article is central to this distinction) is 
not confined to populist slogans and apologists 
of (a now impossible) antisemitism. Rather, it 
is present in many critical accounts of antisemi-
tism. However, this problem of its conflation is 
not only one of theoretical error—although it is 
that as well—but also runs the risk of becoming 
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a resource in the canon of antisemitism itself. 
And, as will shall see, it is as much a case of 
“intended consequences” as “unintended.” 
Underpinning this part of my presentation 
is two further maxims that Robert often states. 
The first, which appears overtly in Political 
Investigations,6 but acted as a guide to almost all 
his writings, was what he termed a critique of the 
critique—that is, a critique of the critique made 
in the name of human emancipation, or what 
Robert refers to, in Ten Reasons Why I Oppose 
Boycotts Against Israeli Academics (And Why 
You Should Too), “a battle for our future polit-
ical life.”7 It is, moreover, a maxim that I have 
always associated with a truly critical theory, 
one practiced according to, as Robert notes 
in the same text, “norms of openness, under-
standing, inquiry, criticism, self-criticism and 
dialogue.” The second maxim, and one equally 
important and which flows from the first, is the 
lack of critical distance one finds in many “oppo-
sitional” works. Robert’s response to the call for 
the boycott of Israeli academics is an exemplary 
illustration of these guiding principles.
I want to illustrate the utility of these 
maxims through reference to three accounts 
of antisemitism and the Holocaust; one in the 
immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, (Adorno 
and Horkheimer); the second, from the era of 
“post-modernism” (Lyotard) and the third, 
more recent, from the “return to the political” 
(Badiou). I conclude the essay with a discus-
sion of Hannah Arendt, a thinker with whom 
Robert was in dialogue over the past few years.8
In all of these instances we see not only the 
idea that antisemitism in general and Nazi geno-
cidal antisemitism in particular is a response to 
the realities of Jewish existence but also to an 
abstraction and reification of that reality which, 
inter alia, converts Jews into “the Jews.”
ADORNO AND HORKHEIMER
This idea of the lack of critical distance between 
real Jews and the anti-Semitic concept of “the 
Jews” appears in arguments that imply that 
antisemitism’s (genocidal or otherwise) “hos-
tility toward” Jews is premised on an actually 
existing characteristic of real Jews. We see this 
common thread within “critical thinking” as 
early as Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.9 For Adorno and Horkheimer, 
modern (genocidal) antisemitism arises as 
by-product of the rise and dictates of monopoly 
capitalism that emerged from market or bour-
geois capitalism. Monopoly capitalism points 
to the dominance of commodification in which 
everything can be exchanged for anything else. 
At the level of the individual, the dictates of 
commodification—in which the universal pre-
vails over the particular—entails a loss of sub-
jectivity and the rise of the masses, or what they 
refer to as “subjects without subjectivity.” This 
aphorism points to the idea that, like univer-
sally exchangeable commodities, individuals 
also sacrifice and repress their own selves; that 
in taking on the characteristics of the commodi-
ty’s abstract universal exchange-value, they have 
no option but to deny their own particularity, 
their own unique individual attributes. 
Inherent in this shift from market (or bour-
geois) capital to monopoly capital are the realms 
of production and consumption that merge 
under into the control of monopolies and car-
tels. An important consequence is the destruc-
tion of the market, the realm of exchange. It 
is this realm that, for Adorno and Horkheimer, 
was the site for, and guarantee of bourgeois 
property and the related phenomena of individ-
ual juridical rights, the rule of law, abstract jus-
tice, the division of state and civil society, and 
so on. Although critical of such rights as they 
actually existed, Adorno and Horkheimer saw 
them as products of enlightenment and eman-
cipation that contained within them, at the very 
least, the potential of human freedom; a poten-
tial undermined and reversed by the inexorable 
logic and rationality of capital itself.
It is within this loss of the realm of exchange 
that Adorno and Horkheimer locate the emer-
gence of modern (genocidal) antisemitism. 
Their thesis turns on their historical presentation 
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of the Jews as the embodiment of the now 
defunct realm of the market. Inherent in this 
account is that the Jews correspondingly are 
said embody the freedoms and values inher-
ent in that realm. The continued presence of 
the Jews, therefore, stands as a reminder of the 
promise and potential of an emancipation and 
that, in order to survive, needed to be and have 
been repressed by the masses. Understood in 
this light, the Jews’ very existence becomes a 
provocation; a reminder of the freedom that has 
now been endless deferred. Genocidal antisem-
itism appears on the scene when this anti- 
Jewish subconscious ressentiment is permitted to 
be released; a release that, because of the discharge 
of energy as well as the lack of actual damage it 
inflicts on the structures of monopoly capitalism, 
does nothing other than serve the dominant eco-
nomic, special, and cultural interests.
For present purposes, it is interesting to note 
that the antisemites’ image of the Jew as the 
embodiment of the market, that is, “the mid-
dleman,” the agent of the market, the buyer and 
seller of others (congealed) labor, the necessity 
and dominance of money (as well as of law and 
potential freedom) coincides with what Adorno 
and Horkheimer treat as the actuality of both 
Jewish modern history and modern Jewish 
experience. 
The shortcoming of Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
thesis on antisemitism is not only its lack of crit-
ical distance between the antisemites’ concept of 
“the Jews,” but also, their failing to apply their 
critical account of the nature of modern society to 
their own work. In the same way that Adorno and 
Horkheimer criticize the world of domination 
brought into existence by monopoly capital, that 
is, the destruction or repression of the particular 
at the expense of the universal; so too do they treat 
the antisemites’ “universalizing” of the concept 
of the “economic Jew” as if no other aspects of 
Jewish particularity exist. It is as if the antisemites’ 
concept of “the Jew” speaks the “truth” and makes 
invisible the multi-dimensional uniqueness and 
particularity of flesh and blood Jews (including, 
of course, Jews’s own universal aspects). It may 
not be too much to say, therefore, that it is these 
aspects of Jewish existence that, having been 
excluded by antisemites unwittingly also escapes 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s own critical think-
ing; a thinking that, ultimately, falls short of the 
critical distance between an understanding of 
antisemitism and its critique.
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD
We see a similar lack of critical distance between 
real Jews and the antisemitic concept of “the 
Jews” being carried forward within post-modern 
thinking.
For example, for Lyotard, it was “the Jews” 
who, as “the People of the Book,” whose fate was 
to serve as the moral conscience of Europe.10 
The Jews’ extermination followed on from cen-
turies of “Europe’s” attempt to rid itself of this 
differend, of a morality that cannot be incorpo-
rated into the prevailing “discourses” without 
risking their disturbance, but which nonethe-
less remains in “Europe’s” un- or subconscious-
ness. Yet, the continued presence of “the Jews” 
as moral conscience, resulted in sporadic violent 
attempts to be rid of such a “bad conscience.” 
The Shoah was not only one such attempt, but 
also, in its scope and scale, the final one. In the 
face of that finality, it is no longer “the Jews” 
who are the embodiment of “Europe’s” dis-
avowed moral conscious, it is, what he terms, 
“Auschwitz.” In the post-holocaust world—a 
phrase that marks the Shoah as both begin-
ning and end—it is “Auschwitz” that replaces 
“the Jews” as the contemporary moral differend. 
Taking place within the European unconscious-
ness and unable to be consciously recognized, 
Auschwitz, like “the Jews” it swallowed runs the 
risk of disturbing the conscious “discourses” of 
the present at any given moment.
Two things come into relief here, first, the 
idea that antisemitism in general and geno-
cidal antisemitism in particular, is treated as a 
reaction to not only an alleged characteristic of 
“real” Jews, but also to a particular characteristic 
that is treated as if it was the whole thing. Read, 
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perhaps ungenerously, not only does antisemitism 
and the Shoah appear as a reaction to some-
thing said to be a or the characteristic of Jews, 
but also, that this characteristic, this one- 
dimensional view of “the Jews,” served as a 
provocation, an irritant, that antisemitism sought 
to counter. In other words, for Lyotard, “the Jews” 
of the antisemitic imagination speak—to some 
extent—to the existence of socially existing “real” 
Jews. To this point, one can add, that as with 
the antisemites, Lyotard’s anti-antisemitism, 
abstracts and reifies Jews into “the Jews,” albeit 
for seemingly opposite reasons.
Yet, herein lies the rub. As noted, for Lyotard, 
the moral or ethical differend is no longer “the 
Jews,” but now “Auschwitz” which, as I have 
mentionedm is not only seen as the “latest” 
episode in “Europe’s” “history” of antisemitism, 
but the “final one” (Here, I will let this idea 
and its connection to the Nazi euphemism “the 
final solution to the Jewish Question” hang in 
the air). It is now “Auschwitz” that becomes the 
differend, residing in, but still, at an unconscious 
level, making its disturbing presence felt as an 
unidentifiable thorn in the flesh of “the West.” 
In other words, the potential remains that, at 
one point or another, “Europe” will vent its fury 
on this moral notion of “Auschwitz” as it did 
upon the moral presentation of “the Jews.” 
However, it is important to recognize that 
this philosophical shortcoming has important 
political consequences. Nowhere is this con-
sequence more in evidence than in this quote 
from Sara Roy;11 the idea that not only have 
real Jews betrayed the supposed morality of 
Lyotard’s “the Jews,” but also, they have done 
so by betraying the post-holocaust differend of 
“Auschwitz.”
What did my family perish for in the ghet-
tos and concentration camps of Poland? Yet, 
they [Holocaust survivors] stood as a moral 
challenge among us as living embodiments 
of a history, way of life that long predated the 
Holocaust and Zionism (and that Zionism has 
long denigrated). . . . I wonder what is truly 
left to take their place, to fill the moral void of 
their absence.
For Roy, and for so many others, real Jews 
today; what she calls “Zionists,” are guilty of 
a double betrayal—of both their being “the 
Jews” (embodied morality) and of a Holocaust 
(“Auschwitz”) that “Zionism has long deni-
grated.” If anyone, therefore, has not learnt the 
supposed (moral) “lessons” of the Holocaust, 
it is the real Jews present in this world. What 
adds to this alleged failing, is that it was “the 
Jews” themselves that were destined to carry 
that moral burden in the first place. Finally, as 
Nietzsche observes so well, since it is in the reg-
ister of “morality” and not law, the ressentiment 
against these betrayals know no limit; and so 
the cycle far from ending, just begins again.
ALAIN BADIOU
Like Lyotard, Badiou also implies that the reason 
for the Nazi persecution and murder of Jews was 
a consequence of something “the Jews” really 
were.12 What is interesting about Badiou’s work 
is that, despite his insistence that he is speaking 
of the Nazi, antisemitic, concept of “the Jews” and 
seeks to distinguish that concept from real Jews, 
he, nonetheless, in a similar vein to Roy, reshapes 
it as a weapon against contemporary Jewry.
Using the dialectic of universal and partic-
ular—precisely the critique Robert and Philip 
use to open up critique’s history of the “Jewish 
Question” and to discuss Badiou briefly in their 
recent work—Badiou argues that the Nazis 
could not but see their own particularity (their 
“Germaness” or “Ayrianism”) as “universal.” As 
such, they could not but come into conflict with 
what Badiou treats the “true universal”—“the 
Jews”; a conflict that could only be resolved by 
the “true universal’s” destruction. 
Far from challenging the Nazi image of 
“the (universal) Jew,” Badiou verifies it. He 
does so by drawing on one particular historical 
moment of Jewish history—the revolutionary 
zeal of sections of Eastern Europe Jewry at the 
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turn of the twentieth century—as if it spoke a 
universal Jewish ‘truth.” Shorn of its baroque 
Heidigerainism, Badiou claims that this onto-
logical “truth” and its abstract universal content 
is masked or blocked by any and all expression 
of Jewish identity. For Badiou, therefore, the 
“true” Jew, the “real Jew,” “the universal Jew” 
is the one who discards his Jewish particularity. 
This point in made explicit where he states:
An abstract variation of my position consists 
in pointing out that, from the apostle Paul to 
Trotsky, including Marx and Freud, Jewish 
communitarianism has only underpinned cre-
ative universalism in so far as there have been 
new points of rupture with it. It is clear that 
today’s equivalent of Paul’s religious rupture 
with established Judaism, of Spinoza’s rationalist 
rupture with the synagogue, of Marx’s political 
rupture with the bourgeois integration of a part 
of his community of origin . . . (Polemics, 215)
Badiou fails to break free of the Nazism’s image 
of “the Jews,” and as a consequence falls into 
ways of thinking associated with contemporary 
antisemitism. He argues that since Nazism did 
not target Jews because of the virulence of their 
own antisemitic imagery, but rather imagined 
“the Jews” as personifications or embodiments 
of an abstract, human (“un-Jewish” universal-
ism) any connection made between those mur-
dered Jews and those identifying as Jews today 
is an illegitimate. Indeed, for Badiou, not only 
is it illegitimate, the alleged connection serves 
to offer Jews an unwarranted “privilege” in 
today’s world; most notably in connection with 
matters relating to the State of Israel and its 
conflict with the Palestinians.
 In short, Badiou’s argument on this point 
is little more than a reworking in form, but 
not content, of the contemporary antisemitic 
myth that, “the Jews” use the Shoah to not only 
“silence criticism of Israel,” but also to give 
Israel itself a free pass for contemporary Jewish 
(i.e. Israeli) crimes. Again, Badiou’s thinking is 
clear on this point. The quote just given con-
tinues with the view that today, the equivalent 
of Paul, Marx, Freud, Trotsky, Spinoza who to 
play a role in “creative universalism” have aban-
doned their Jewish identity,
[I]s a subjective rupture with the State of 
Israel, not with its empirical existence, which 
is neither more not less impure than that of all 
states, but with its exclusive identitarian claim 
to be a “Jewish state” and with it draws inces-
sant privileges from this claim, especially when 
it comes to trampling underfoot what serves us 
as international law. (Polemics, 215)
The ultimate irony of Badiou’s account of 
antisemitism, therefore, is not so much the 
constant universalizing of the particular (both 
in terms of Jewish history and of “theory”), 
nor his lack of critical distance between antise-
mitic conception of “the Jews” and the reali-
ties of “actually-existing Jews,”  but, rather, as 
with antisemitism itself, the ways in which the 
“idea” of “the Jews” is treated as if it somehow 
speaks “the Truth” about a hitherto hidden 
Jewish “essence.” If, for the Nazis, such think-
ing resulted in their physical deaths, for Badiou, 
it is a call for their political, social, and cultural 
erasure; an erasure that, not for the first time, 
is made in the name of human emancipation.
At this juncture in the essay, it is worth 
reflecting on a problem that has emerged from 
the above discussion. I have illustrated the 
ways in which critical thinkers have, either 
consciously or not, failed to achieve a critical 
distance between the antisemites’ concept of 
“the Jews” and the actually existing or “flesh 
and blood” Jews. This shortcoming turns on 
the idea that, ultimately, the antisemities’ con-
cept is treated as if it captured some “truth” 
or “essence” of “flesh and blood” Jews; be it 
“moral” (Lyotard), “political” (Badiou), or “eco-
nomic” (Adorno and Horkheimer). 
HANNAH ARENDT
The question remains, therefore, how can we 
account for antisemitism without falling into 
this trap? How can we offer an account of the 
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connection between “flesh and blood Jews” 
and the antisemite’s concept of “the Jew” or 
“the Jews”? It is these questions that Hannah 
Arendt set herself in her extended discussion of 
antisemitism that forms the first typic of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism13 where she asks how 
the “ludicrous story of the Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion . . . [came to] explain . . . the improbable 
tale contained enough plausibility to be useful 
to anti-Jewish propaganda to begin with” (p. 9).
In answering this question, Arendt steers a 
course between two dangers. The first danger is 
a refusal to offer an account that blurs the dis-
tinction between Jews and “the Jews,” and the 
second danger she confronts is the ways in which 
what she terms “eternal antisemitism” and/or 
“scapegoat theory” writes the Jews out of the 
world in which antisemitism is present. Arendt 
notes the irony of the correspondence with this 
absence and the aims of antisemitism itself.
In place of these two common approaches, 
Arendt investigates the relations between Jews 
and non-Jews that developed in the context of 
the emergence of modern Western and Central 
European nation-states. She argues further that 
it was these relations that were captured in the 
ideology of antisemitism albeit in a manner that 
completely distorted and, eventually, broke free 
of the history it claimed to articulate.
One of the strengths of Arendt’s account, 
and in my opinion, one of her most insight-
ful observations—is that without at least some 
connection to the actually-existing world, ide-
ologies in general and the ideology of antisem-
itism in particular, would simply not have the 
power, the traction, to convince population 
after population (or, at lease, large sections of 
them) of its claim to explain (away) the com-
plexities of history; past, present, and future. 
Without that connection, the seeming explan-
atory promise of antisemitism to explain the 
world would appear as fantastical as explaining 
history by reference to the existence of dragons!
For Arendt, ideologies appear to offer “keys 
to history” through which entire swathes of 
human history, along with all its conflicts and 
complexities, contradictions and chance, are 
shoehorned into one discrete and determined 
“theory.” As Arendt noted,
Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of 
the world historical processes—the secret of 
the past, the intricacies of the present, the 
uncertainties of the future— because of the 
logic inherent in their respective ideas. (p. 604)
Taking the word ideology seriously, Arendt 
observes that its logos (its “-ology”) refers not 
to its erstwhile content, but rather that it is 
the idea that possesses its own logic, its own 
“unfolding.” Ideology, in other words, tells us 
next to nothing of the historical development 
it clams to capture, but, rather, tells us every-
thing about the idea itself; it is the “idea” that 
masquerades as the “subject-matter of science” 
rather than the world on which it preys. The 
ideology of antisemitism, therefore, can tell 
us nothing about Jews, but tells us everything 
about the nature and development of the antise-
mitic idea of “the Jews.” For Arendt, the study 
of the ideology of antisemitism is the study of an 
idea and the logic of its own propulsion,
Ideological thinking orders facts into an abso-
lutely logical procedure which starts from 
an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing 
everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with 
a constancy that exists nowhere in the realm of 
reality. (p. 607)
With these points in mind, a productive way 
of reading Arendt’s account of antisemitism in 
the first section of Origins is the way in which 
actually existing relations between Jews and 
non-Jews in the emergence and development 
of the modern nation-state comes to be re-read 
through the distorting prism of the ideology 
of antisemitism It was through this ideol-
ogy that, beginning with an admixture of the 
Enlightenment’s legacy of “the abstract Jew” as 
a “principle of evil,” the fantasies of “crackpots 
and charlatans”14 and the haunting of the past 
into the present, the entirety of modern Jewish 
existence collapsed into one long liturgy of 
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anti-Jewish hatred. It is a tale that, as Arendt 
notes, tells us far more about antisemitism than 
it does about the Jews.
Arendt’s connections and disconnections 
between the actual situation of Jewish and 
non-Jewish relations and its representation 
through the distortions of ideology can be 
traced clearly in her work on antisemitism.
In Arendt’s account, we read how and why 
Jews came to be involved in the financing of 
both the absolute monarchs and of the early- 
modern state. We read how and why, in this 
political context, Jews maintained, and were 
expected to maintain international connections 
between themselves and how such connections 
resulted in financing not only sometimes oppos-
ing armies, but also the peace conferences that 
followed. We read how and why Jewish eman-
cipation’s uneven development (which sections 
of Jewry were emancipated and when) was inti-
mately connected to this Jewish-state intimacy. 
We read also, how and why the “sons” of these 
Court Jews and State Jews came to be attracted 
to the liberal professions and what we would 
now call the professions and the “cultural” or 
“creative industries” (i.e. the law, the arts, the 
media, etc.) and how, finally, the social condi-
tions brought about in the wake of these polit-
ical interactions gave rise to what came to be 
called “Jewishness.”
It does not take a great leap of the imagi-
nation to see how these political realities fed 
into an ideology of antisemitism and captured 
within its unfolding web of nonsense came to 
be presented as Jews bring the “power behind 
the throne,” of the malevolent and dominating 
power of “the Rothschilds” or of “Soros,” or 
the idea that Jews inaugurate all wars for their 
own nefarious interests, or the idea of a transna-
tional “Jewish World Power” or “Jewish Lobby,” 
or how Jews are said to “control the media,” or 
how “Jewishness” came to be presented in the 
faux-biology of “race,” and so on. 
Although not without its problems, Arendt’s 
approach to understanding antisemitism (and 
not only in its genocidal manifestation), suc-
ceeds in offering a clear demarcation between 
actually-existing, politically and socially located 
Jews and the antisemitic contrivance of “the 
Jews.” Moreover, in so doing, her thinking on 
antisemitism in general comes closest to match-
ing that very first piece of advice Robert offered 
me as I was embarking on the study of this sub-
ject—if you want to know anything about Jews, 
never listen to antisemites.
CONCLUSION
In times past, this would be the moment that 
I would email Robert with the essay and ask for 
his comments. All I can do instead is to draw 
on Robert’s insights and thoughts that I was 
fortunate to share and, one would like to think 
through those conversations, help clarify. This 
essay is one such attempt.
And, at this point, I can do no more than 
quote Samuel Beckett, “You must go on. I can’t 
go on. I’ll go on.”
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